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This article tests the subset of public choice models for social security that have empirical 
implications. The data, collected from OECD countries for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 
and 1990, provide some support for each of the theories.  Higher median voter age, more 
income heterogeneity, greater similarity in family size, and variables that make a public 
pension program more profitable are all associated with a larger program.  However, none 
of the theories explains why the shape of the age distribution and the time trend are so 
important. The results are robust under both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation. 
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If a person has a formal pension, the chances are that at least part of his retirement 
benefits will be paid for by a form of social security. Indeed, in  1993, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and five African countries were the only nations that did not have a 
mandated old-age pension program.  Exceptions to the pay-as-you-go approach, such as 
Chile's privatized pension system, remain rare.  Of the industrial democracies belonging 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), virtually all 
have a pay-as-you-go system. Yet there is no immediately obvious reason why this might 
be so. Naive models of the adoption of a public pension program assume that a country 
chooses the most efficient method of saving for retirement. Following Aaron (1966), a 
nation adopts a social security system if  its rate of return, equal to the population growth 
rate plus the productivity growth rate, exceeds the real interest rate. However, as 
Browning (1975) shows, a model of public choice in a democracy can yield inefficiently 
high levels of social security. Following Browning's seminal paper, there has evolved a 
vast theoretical literature that attempts to explain 1) why these transfers from young to old 
exist in democracies even when contributors outnumber recipients, 2) why, if there is a 
majority in favor of such transfers, the amounts are not even larger, and 3) what 
determines the enormous differences in these programs across countries.' 
Empirical work must show which of the many models of public choice proposed 
in the literature are good approximations of the political process, in the sense of 
predicting future levels of public pension plans.  Tests of the various models are also 
necessary to make a normative statement of whether the democratic process overshoots 
the optimal level of public pensions. Yet the general difficulties that complicate the 
testing of public choice models of economic policy are relevant to the public pension 
choice as well. 
For a comprehensive survey of this theoretical literature, see Breyer (1994). 
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individual social security laws are complicated, and it is difficult to determine their long- 
run effects. Although U.S. social security provisions are unusual in that they are debated 
and amended every two years, in fact, there have been only five major legislated changes 
in the size of the program since 1950. Statistical inference based on the timing and 
magnitude of these five observations (as in Congleton and Shughart [I 9901 and Turner 
[I 9841) must necessarily remain imprecise.2  A cross-sectional analysis of  the effect of 
congressional-district voting patterns on U.S. social security legislation offers its own 
difficulties. All that is observed are voting records for the bill as finally presented. 
Subsumed beneath the surface are the logrolling and party loyalties that went into crafting 
the final form of the legislation and collecting the votes needed for passage (or defeat). 
For example, in  1994, HR427 was passed, which restricted benefits paid to alcoholics or 
drug addicts under Social Security Insurance and made the Social Security Administration 
an independent agency. The vote was 41 3-0 for passage of the bill.  It is unclear how one 
can test theories of public choice from such data. 
This paper compares the behavior of similar countries over wide time intervals. 
To this end, we have assembled a data set that properly tests the correspondence of a 
country's underlying economic and demographic structure with the public pension 
outcome. We have chosen countries that are similar in their democratic processes and 
industrial structures both to emphasize the variables that are shifting over this period and 
to highlight their effect on the level of pay-as-you-go pensions.  Observations in the data 
set are for OECD countries in the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. These large time 
intervals allow a country the leeway to change its social security program to the desired 
level even if the legislative process moves slowly.  Of course, it is difficult to attribute the 
different outcomes in data from several nations to differences in the particular set of 
explanatory variables we have measured.  We use several econometric techniques to 
Congleton and Shughart's analysis uses the size of the average benefit as the dependent 
variable for yearly observations. To the extent that benefits change without new 
legislation, the timing of the legislation becomes less important. 
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The empirical work presented in this paper is a clear improvement over previous 
empirical tests of public choice theories.  Unlike Tabellini's (1990) cross-section of 63 
countries, our sample consists of nations that are quite similar in both their level of 
industrial development and their strong democratic political process.  (Interestingly, it is 
within this subsample of countries that Tabellini's results are not all robust.) Compared to 
Rizzo's study of the post-war Italian experience or her examination of a single cross- 
section of OECD members (1990, chapter 7),  our panel of countries provides far more 
precise estimates. 
In section 2, we describe four models  .  of public choice for social security, focusing 
on the empirical implications of each. We use a similar structure and the same notation 
throughout our discussion and do not presume to describe all the theories in the vast 
literature on public choice of public pension systems.  However elegant or persuasive 
excluded theories might have been, our criterion for inclusion was that a theory must have 
an unequivocal empirical implication.  We found this to be a very small subsample. 
We then describe the data set we have gathered for this paper, paying particular 
attention to trends in the OECD countries and comparing the general patterns in this 
group with the better-known pattern in the U.S. social security program.  Finally, we 
report the results of our tests and finish with some concluding remarks. 
2. Four Models of Public Choice for Public Pensions 
Each of the models discussed here is based on the common paradigm of public 
choice theory that participants in the political decision process vote to maximize their 
utility over lifetime consumption.  All are compared to a benchmark case in which the 
single decisionmaker is a benevolent dictator, and all are similar in that they describe a 
small open economy where the wage and interest rate are exogenously given and constant 
over time, and where workers supply one unit of labor to the market.  The models cover 
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adjacent points corresponding to the age difference between two subsequent generations. 
The term "generation t" refers to the group of individuals who are in their first working 
age in period t.  Only persons in this age group can have children. If  M, is the 
reproduction rate of the society in period t-1 (i.e., the ratio of the number of people in 
generation t to generation t-I), then a sequence of  numbers M, (t = 1,2,  ...) describes the 
population path. 
If z, is the per capita contribution of workers to the unfunded pension system in 
period t, then the payment to each pensioner is 
(2.1)  Pt = ztMt. 
Each worker's and each pensioner's consumption (where c, is a worker's and zt is a 
pensioner's consumption in period t, and st  is a worker's savings) is 
(2.2)  ct = w - zt - st and 
(2.3)  zt = Rst-,  + Pt. 
Pensioners do not save, since there is no bequest m~tive.~ 
We test the following four models:  a) benevolent dictator, b) direct democracy 
with majority rule, c)  horizontal redistribution, and d) rational family. 
a.  Benevolent Dictator 
A benevolent dictator model compares the rates of return on contributions to a 
pay-as-you-go system (i.e., the population growth rate plus the growth rate of wages due 
to technical progress) to the rate of return on capital, which equals the interest rate. In a 
world of uncertainty, capital has the additional disadvantage of providing no protection 
against unanticipated inflation. Therefore, a benevolent dictator would choose a larger 
unfunded system, the higher the sum of the rates of population growth and productivity 
Some results rely on the continuous-time model, a different and mathematically more 
complex version of the theory in which each individual lives for A periods as a worker 
and for T-A periods as a retiree. 
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The same conclusion holds for any model in which politicians behave as if they 
maximize a weighted sum of  the utilities of the citizens, as they do in Verhoeven and 
Verbon (199 1). 
b.  Direct Democracy with Majority Rule 
In the simplest public choice model of Browning (1975) and Greene (1974), each 
person votes for the pension system that promises the largest lifetime utility.  The major 
two assumptions of this model are 1) the voter believes that the program he votes on will 
continue at least until he retires, and 2) liquidity constraints prevent borrowing against the 
value of future pension c~aims.~  The voter's beliefs are, in an important sense, irrational 
in this model. If demographic changes occur, then there is strong evidence that the new 
voting structure will imply a different contribution level from the one currently being 
voted on.  Thus, voters believe in a system that is not even consistent within the context 
of their own model.  Sometimes, as in Browning (1975) and others, this irrational 
expectation is defended on the ground that voting takes place infrequently, ensuring 
stability of the benefit. 
We discuss the model in a continuous-time version.  In this case, the desired 
contribution level from a voter's point of  view increases monotonically with age; thus, 
the median voter is generally an older worker.  An increase in the population growth rate 
has two separate effects:  First, the median voter becomes younger, which tends to 
depress the equilibrium contribution level.  Second, the population growth rate becomes 
higher, which increases the growth rate of the economy.  From this second effect, the 
Browning's model and other similar ones that followed (e.g., Boadway and Wildasin 
[1989]) use this as'sumption to explain that the program size is not even higher. An 
alternative explanation would be that present voters take into account the negative effects 
of too-high contribution rates on the work effort of future generations. 
The comparative-static implications of this type of model have been examined by 
Townley (1981) and Wickstrom (1984) for the case of a constant growth rate. 
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the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption exceeds (is equal to, falls short of) 
unity in absolute terms. 
Thus, the effect of a change in the reproduction rate on the level of social security 
contributions in a direct voting equilibrium is indeterminate.  Also, the change in the size 
of the desired pension benefit following an increase in the reproduction rate can be 
positive even if  the change in the contribution level is negative, since the rate of return 
rises.  Furthermore, an increase in the rate of productivity growth differs from an increase 
in the rate of population growth insofar as it raises the rate of return to pay-as-you-go 
pensions without decreasing median voter age.  Therefore, although the effect of the 
reproduction rate on the optimal values of T,  and P,  is indeterminate as such, it should be 
equal to the conditional effect of a change in M,, holding median voter age constant. 
c.  Income Heterogeneity and Horizontal Redistribution 
In some public pension systems, notably that of the Netherlands, retirement 
benefits are practically the same for every retiree, whereas contributions are collected 
from workers in strict proportion to their wage income.  This feature is used by Tabellini 
(1990) in a two-period overlapping generations model with no intertemporal dependence 
of contribution rates.  Hence, the results would hold even if there were no future after the 
period under consideration, meaning that the model is essentially static.  The society 
consists of a number of  retirees ("parents"), each of whom has the same number of 
working-age descendants.  There is mutual altruism between parents and descendants, but 
it is so weak that, in the absence of a social security system, private transfers are zero in 
either direction.  However, workers are allowed to save for their retirement consumption 
as well as to borrow against future pension benefits. 
Workers differ with respect to their wage incomes, and thus a flat-benefit, 
proportional-contribution social security scheme involves a transfer from workers to 
pensioners and from high-income to low-income earners.  If voted on in isolation, the 
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since the ratio at which a worker's gift is converted to a benefit to his parent is the same 
as in private transfers, and, by assumption, altruism is so weak that these are ruled out.  In 
contrast, the second kind of transfer, if available on its own, would be accepted by  all 
families with below-average income earners and rejected by everyone else. 
Because the two types of transfers are available only in combination, voters' 
preferences with respect to alternative contribution rates can be determined in the 
following manner:  Among workers, the median-income voter will definitely reject any 
positive tax rate 7,, but below a certain income threshold (which is lower than the 
median), workers will prefer positive taxes because the ratio of their taxes to their 
parent's retirement benefits becomes favorable.  Moreover, the lower the income, the 
higher is the optimal value of 7,.  Conversely, while the parent of  a median-income earner 
will favor a positive tax rate, the tax rate desired by a pensioner will be a declining 
function of  his descendant's income, and above a certain threshold, the optimal 7, will be 
zero. 
Consequently, there is a value of the tax rate, T,*, such that exactly half the voters 
(i.e., more than 50 percent of pensioners but less than 50 percent of workers) would 
prefer a higher and half would prefer a lower tax rate.  Because of the single-peakedness 
of  individual preferences, 7,"  constitutes a political equilibrium.  Tabellini (1990, section 
5) shows that, among other influences, apositive value of 7," is more likely (and, if 
positive, its value is larger), the greater the pre-tax income inequality and the lower the 
population growth factor M, (the ratio of  young to old voters). Thus, a higher median 
voter age would reflect a slower growing population and a larger program. 
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All the above models of democratic decisionmaking on public pensions are based 
on the assumption that each voter, before casting his vote on a particular proposal, 
behaves rationally by comparing the costs and benefits accruing to himself alone. In this 
comparison, private annuities are considered to be the only alternative to mandatory 
public pension plans on  a pay-as-you-go basis.  Breyer and Schulenburg (1987, 1990) 
propose an alternative model of majority voting on a mandatory public pension scheme in 
which each family is treated as a decisionmaking unit.  Here, a different type of  social 
contrivance is considered as an additional substitute to public pensions, namely, the 
within-family pay-as-you-go system. For a given family, this approach will provide a 
higher rate of return than the nationwide system if  the ratio between workers and 
pensioners within the family itself is higher than in society at large. 
The demographic structure of the society is described by  the following 
assumptions. Each individual lives for three periods (as child, worker, and pensioner). 
Therefore, in any period t, society is composed of  members of three different generations. 
Each worker can have up to two children, where the probabilities of  having one or two 
children, q, and p,, are time dependent but do not differ across members of the same 
generation. For society as a whole, the individual fertility probabilities can be interpreted 
as relative frequencies. Thus, in period t, the reproduction rate of the population (the 
average number of children per working-age person) is given by 
(2.4)  Mt = 2pt + q,. 
If  a "family" is defined as a group consisting of one pensioner and all his direct 
descendants, then the assumptions mentioned above imply that in every period, there are 
nine types of families that differ in their generational composition, the relative 
frequencies of which depend on the fertility parameters of  the present and previous 
interval. 
Analysis of the voting process is simplified by  the assumption that in each period, 
there is just a yes-no decision on the existence of a mandatory public pension scheme, but 
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no decision on the level of contributions and benefits.  Instead, it is assumed that as long 
as such a system survives, the contribution per worker is fixed at 7,  whereas the 
retirement benefit is determined endogenously by  obeying the budget equation for the 
pension plan. 
All workers and pensioners are eligible to vote in this direct-majority decision, 
and it is assumed that all members of a specific family type will vote for abolishing the 
system if the discounted value of all present and future contributions from family 
members exceeds the corresponding value of their total retirement benefits. 
What is interesting for our purposes is, first, how the percentage of "no"  votes 
behaves when M is decreased, holding the distribution of children constant.  Surprisingly, 
this percentage does not fall monotonically, so an equally clear-cut result as in most of the 
models discussed above does not emerge.  What can be said, however, is that for steady- 
state populations, a majority of votes always goes against the pay-as-you-go system if  the 
population is shrinking (M < I), whereas this is not the case if it is growing (M > l), as 
long as children are fairly evenly distributed. Furthermore, the percentage of "no"  votes 
is larger the more unevenly children are distributed, i.e., the greater is the variance of the 
variable "number of children in a family" in the society. 
With respect to the other important determinants of voter behavior, the interest 
rate and the rate of productivity growth should play the same role as in the benevolent 
dictator model, since the capital reserve system remains as a second alternative to the 
public pay-as-you-go system. Predictions resulting from the respective models are 
summarized in table 1. 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1  Description of the Data 
Theories of social security determination offer unique problems in empirical 
testing.  Unlike a community tax, where different regional observations are possible, 
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the entire economy. Yet, unlike the money supply, for example, a social security program 
rarely changes, making the use of frequent time series for a single economy problematic. 
Our solution is to use a set of similar economies. The low frequency allows us to assume 
that the parameters for the economy are exogenously given to the voter. Over a 10-year 
span, it is assumed that voters have enough time to change the program to reflect the 
outcome of the public choice mechanism.  The years chosen are 1960, 1970, 1980, and 
1990, which enables us to use detailed demographic data from the decennial censuses that 
many countries conducted during these years. 
We use OECD data for a variety of reasons. First, more data are available from 
these than from other countries, and the information is more reliable and more 
comparable between countries than in a data set with more diverse nations.  Also, the 
political regime is generally democratic in these countries, with a few exceptions that we 
exclude from the sample. This allows us to interpret the public pension program as an 
outcome of the democratic process. 
We measure the size and structure of a pay-as-you-go system along several 
dimensions, amounting to five different dependent variables. We use total social security 
tax contributions, total benefits paid, and total pensions paid by the government (all as a 
fraction of GNP) to measure the size of the program.  We also use total benefits per 
person over age 60 and total pensions paid by the government per person over age 60 
(both in thousands of  1982 U.S. dollars) to determine the benefit received by  each 
pensioner. 
Each of these measures has advantages and disadvantages. The terms social 
security contributions and social security benejits can have a variety of meanings to 
different countries at different times.  Most countries include a measure of the cost of 
medical insurance for the elderly in these data.  This is clearly a general transfer from the 
young to the old and represents much of the outcome of a public choice mechanism that 
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would determine the size of the social security program.  However, the reported figures 
for social security contributions and benefits have the disadvantage that the variance in 
the definition of the program creates noise and makes estimates less precise. 
Contributions and benefits do not include such items as military retirement 
benefits, railroad retirement funds (in the United States), or civil service pension benefits. 
The public pension data do include these figures, but do not encompass medical transfers 
to the elderly. While programs such as military retirement are a transfer to older people, 
the transfer is not sufficiently general to match most public choice models of social 
security.  In this sense, public pension data are less useful than contributions and 
benefits.  They have the additional disadvantage of being unavailable for 1990. 
Our data set also includes the percentage of social security tax paid by employers 
via a hidden employment tax.  This variable may account for the fiscal illusion common 
among voters of not counting employer contributions as a cost of the program.  Over the 
full sample period, each dollar of social security tax paid by U.S. workers was matched 
by a dollar contributed by employers (50 percent of the total tax).  Australia and New 
Zealand, which paid for social security out of general tax revenues, were the only OECD 
countries not to fund social security with a designated tax. 
Table 2 presents the changes in several measures of the public pension system for 
our sample of 20 c~untries.~  The same variables for the more generally known program 
in the United States are also shown for comparison.  Benefits and contributions measured 
as a fraction of GNP rose dramatically during this period for both the United States and 
the OECD sample as a whole.  The experience in the United States was consistent with 
that of the rest of the OECD countries in that the largest growth in the program occurred 
from 1980 to 1990. 
The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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share of GNP for the OECD mask great variations in the time-series patterns within a 
country.  Although public pensions as a fraction of GNP rose for each country with the 
passing of every decade, some nations actually cut the size of their program when 
measured by contributions or benefits as a fraction of GNP.  Others saw explosive 
growth in social security during the 1980s, while still others matched the time-series 
pattern of the United States. Thus, there is large within-country variation in the size of 
public pension programs.  This is true for the benefits per capita and benefits per 
pensioner measures as well.  The U.S. program, at  between 6 and 7 percent of GNP in 
1990, is relatively small compared to those of most other OECD countries. In  1985, the 
size of public pension expenditures ranged from 2.1 percent of GNP in Portugal to 14.5 
percent of GNP in Austria.  Social security contributions showed the same wide range in 
1990, running from 2 to 17 percent of GNP. 
The percentage of social security financed by employers is as large as it has ever 
been, on average. Again, the pattern varies from country to country.  Belgium, for 
example, cut the fraction paid by employers between 1960 and 1970 and then increased it 
between 1970 and 1990, while Canada increased the fraction between 1960 and 1970 and 
cut it thereafter. In short, the 20 countries show wide variation in all dimensions of their 
public pension programs.  This is true not only in terms of absolute levels, but also in 
terms of time patterns within each country.  Clearly, there are differences in the data that 
the theories need to explain. 
Research suggests that a number of explanatory variables should be important in 
determining the size of a public pension program. The demographic situation of a 
country is represented by  two variables: age of the median voter and ratio of the 40- to 
60-year-old population to pensioners, which is an approximation of  the variable M,.~ 
The variable "ratio of population 20 to 40 years of age to population 40 to 60 years of 
age," which approximates Mt+l,  is highly correlated with median voter age and thus 
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mean of the median voter age is 42.)  If this number is high, then the distribution above 
the median voter is more concentrated toward the working population (and less toward 
pension recipients), if  one holds the median voting age constant. 
The interest rate, growth rate, and inflation rate are all represented by five-year 
averages of the five years preceding and including the year of observation. The interest 
rate is the real rate on the longest government security for which data are available, the 
growth rate is the real growth rate of  GNP, and the inflation rate is the growth rate of  the 
Consumer Price Index. These variables, plus those describing the size of the public 
pension system, could be obtained for 76 core observations representing 20 countries. 
The variables measuring variance of children and variance of  income are less 
straightforward. We found limited household data on the proportion of the population 
living in households of four or less for 56 of the 76 core obser~ations.~  This turns out to 
be a good approximation for the variance of household size within a population, as a 
closely fitted regression suggests.9 We measure income inequality via the Gini 
coefficient, which has been shown to be closely related to the variance of income in the 
OECD countries.1° The Gini coefficient is calculated on the basis of pre-tax income for 
51 of the 76 core observations."  All variables are included in a sample of 44 
observations. Means and standard deviations of our sample are reported in table 3 for the 
76 observations. 
cannot be included in  an equation with the two other demographic variables. 
Richer household size data are not available for many observations. 
The regression is PROPORTION IN HOUSEHOLDS OF SIZE 4 OR LESS = 
1.03 - .13  13 VAR (HOUSEHOLD SIZE), with an R~ of .89 (t-stats are under estimates). 
(39.6)  (1  6.5) 
lo See Sawyer (1976). 
l1  Of course, a problem connected with both the Gini coefficient and the share of the 
population living in households of four or less is that both are affected by the size of the 
public pension program (the latter because public pensions increase the independence of 
the aged) and thus are not necessarily exogenous. 
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The estimation procedure breaks the error term into a classic components scheme: 
(3.1)  P = XP + ei + eit, 
where P is public pension size, P is the vector of parameters of interest, X is the 
explanatory variable matrix, ei  is the country-specific unobserved error, and ei, is a 
random error uncorrelated with X.  If ei  is assumed to be uncorrelated with X, then we use 
a random-effects estimator for P." 
Because the random-effects model is heavily influenced by international variation 
in the variables, we call these estimates explanations of cross-country differences in 
public pension programs.  If ei is assumed to be correlated with X, then a fixed-effect 
estimate of p is more appropriate, and we call these estimates explanations of within- 
country differences in public pension programs.  Our prior belief was that the within- 
country estimates are more reliable tests of which public choice models are supported by 
the data, because each country has a distinct set of institutions and data measuring 
conventions and procedures, which are likely to be correlated with some of the elements 
of X.  For example, the Gini coefficient is calculated from income figures based on tax 
returns from the individual countries. Some countries treat the family as the basic unit of 
taxation, while others tax the individual.  Clearly, this error -- a component of the 
individual country effect ei -- will be correlated with the Gini coefficient. 
This prior belief is not supported by the data, however.  The last rows in tables 4 
and 5 include p-values for the Wald test of the hypothesis that the data could have been 
l2  Both the random-effects and fixed-effects estimates are modified to be consistent and 
efficient given the unbalanced panel design, where some countries include more 
observations than others.  Estimates of the standard errors are also modified to be 
efficient and consistent under any reasonable assumption about the time-series structure 
of the error term, COV(eit,ei  ,+,), for any value of s. 
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should not be interpreted as evidence that the random-effects model provides more 
reliable estimates than the fixed-effects model, but rather as a sign that our data do not 
provide precise enough fixed-effects estimates to distinguish between the two models 
statistically. The main reason for this appears to be the loss in degrees of freedom in a 
fixed-effects estimation, considering the relatively limited sample size. 
The dependent variables, which measure the size of the public pension program, 
include total benefits as a fraction of GNP and benefits per pensioner.'4 Table 4 contains 
estimates of the former and table 5 .includes estimates of  the latter. We report estimates 
both from the full sample of  76 observations, which does not have observations for the 
household size variable or Gini coefficient, and from the reduced sample of 44 
observations, which includes all of  the explanatory variables. 
The most striking result in table 4 lies in the strong and significant positive effect 
of median voter age on program size. This empirical pattern is consistent with only two 
of the theoretical models discussed in section 2 -- the majority voting model of Browning 
and the horizontal redistribution model of Tabellini. 
Holding median voter age constant, the nondemographic variables contribute 
considerably to explaining differences in the size of  the pay-as-you-go system.  In the 
benevolent dictator model, efficiency considerations predict that increasing the 
economy's long-run growth rate should have a positive effect, that increasing the long-run 
interest rate should have a negative effect, and that increasing the inflation rate (and thus 
the variability of  return on the competing real capital assets) should have a positive effect 
on the public pension program.  Table 4 shows that the estimates are consistent with these 
l3  This test, first suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1984) in a balanced panel design, has 
been modified to reflect the unbalanced design of our data. 
l4  Equations with the dependent variable "contributions as a fraction of GNP" yield 
essentially the same result as those with the dependent variable "benefits as a fraction 
of GNP." 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9511.pdfconjectures, with one exception. The effect of rising interest rates on benefits as a 
fraction of GNP is insignificant in the full sample and negative and significant only in the 
reduced sample. 
Column 3 shows that, given median voter age, the size of the program increases 
significantly with the ratio of pensioners to older workers.  This effect might have a 
public choice explanation: Political decisionmakers in a representative democracy are 
responsive to constituencies with a large fraction of pensioners even if these 
constituencies are not pivotal in forming a majority on this particular issue. However, 
the significance of this variable suggests that public choice theories which rest solely on 
the age of  the median voter are not rich enough to describe the determination of the size 
of  the public pension program. The mapping between the age distribution of the 
electorate and program size clearly relies on aspects of the distribution other than its 
median.I5 
The last two columns of  table 4 contain the results for the reduced sample, 
which can be used to test the last two theories.16 A Gini coefficient increases with the 
variance of  income, which the horizontal redistribution theory predicts should have a 
positive effect on the size of the public pension program (if indeed this has a 
redistributive nature). Unlike Tabellini (1990), we think that the best way to test this 
proposition is to include an interaction term ("Gini coefficient for a flat benefit rate"), 
defined as the product of the Gini coefficient and the dummy variable, which is 1 when 
the program provides a flat benefit, and 0 otherwise. Column 4 shows that this variable 
has the predicted positive sign and is not quite significant at the 10 percent level, whereas 
the Gini coefficient itself is insignificant (which is clear from column 5).  Thus, this 
finding provides weak support for the horizontal redistribution model as an explanation 
l5 The variable "fraction of contributions paid by employer" is insignificant. Including it, 
however, has no effect on the other estimates. 
l6 Results from regressions that include M, as a right-hand variable yield essentially the 
same results, except that standard errors'  are wider. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9511.pdfof  the size of the public pension program:  Countries with a flat benefit schedule have 
larger public pension programs when there is more heterogeneity in income.I7 
The family voting model predicts that an  increase in the variance of  the number of 
children should decrease the size of the public pension program.  Greater variance in the 
number of  children is associated with a decrease in the proportion of  people living in 
households of four or less, so that the family voting model predicts that this variable 
should have a positive coefficient. Indeed, the cross-country estimates show this variable 
to be positive and significant. 
Table 5 contains the estimates with respect to the dependent variable "benefits per 
person over age 60." This variable is also positively related to median voter age, although 
the effect is now generally insignificant. This result is due to the strong negative 
correlation between median voter age and the proportion of pensioners in the population, 
which by  itself reduces benefits per pensioner, as shown in equation (2.1). In the full 
sample, the effects of the other three variables related to the relative rates of return of the 
two alternative pension financing systems have the sign predicted by the benevolent 
dictator model in the random-effects estimation, whereas in the fixed-effects estimates, 
only the inflation rate is significant and of the predicted sign.  The ratio of pensioners to 
older workers has no significant effect on benefits per pensioner. 
All estimates of the time trend clearly indicate that the size of the public pension 
program experienced a secular increase. In fact, this result is the strongest of all our 
findings.  The secular tendency for public pension programs to grow, even after 
accounting for the usual suspects of growth in income or a change in demographic 
structure, is puzzling.  One is reminded of  the crude political arguments against social 
security in the 1930s, when opponents predicted that government programs would grow 
on their own.  Indeed, the coefficient of the time trend is usually about 0.002 when 
l7 The countries with flat retirement benefits are Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
New Zealand. 
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paribus, each decade has seen a secular increase of 2 percent of GNP in the size of the 
pay-as-you-go system, making social security the kudzu of government programs.'8 
Another possible explanation for the strong positive time trend is that social security 
programs were phased in gradually.  In Norway, for example, claims to benefits are to 
some extent related to previous contributions. 
Finally, the coefficient on average income displays a robust pattern with 
respect to the data set and estimation technique.  As income per capita increases, the 
proportion of benefits in GNP falls and the benefit per pensioner rises.  Thus, if the public 
choice mechanism expresses a demand for public pensions,  the total public pension is a 
normal necessity. 
4.  Conclusion 
From the many models of public choice of social security, we have listed a 
subset that contains empirical predictions along with the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables.  The bottom line of the exercise is that none of the theories is strongly rejected 
when confronted with data that should be well suited to measuring its predictions.  OECD 
data support the Browning majority-voting model in its most definite prediction -- that 
median voter age has a positive impact on retirement benefits as a fraction of GNP. 
Given median voter age, estimates of variables measuring the efficiency of the public 
pension program vis-i-vis the competing capital markets generally support the intuition 
provided by a benevolent dictator model.  Higher growth rates are associated with larger 
public programs, whereas higher real interest rates are associated with smaller programs. 
"  A specification that uses a dummy for each time period has essentially the same 
results reported here.  Further, the linear specification of a time trend follows the pattern 
of the time dummies very well for the fixed-effect estimates.  For random-effect 
estimates, the pattern of the time dummies shows greater change in the program between 
1970 and 1  980 than during the other intervals. 
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transfers implicit in many social security programs, gets only weak support for its central 
prediction, namely, a positive impact of income heterogeneity on the size of these 
programs.  Family voting, by contrast, gets confirmed with the caveat that we can 
measure its most important explanatory variable -- variance of children -- only indirectly. 
The strongly positive time trends pose a further puzzle for theories of 
public choice.  Why did public pension programs experience a secular increase during 
this period that was not accounted for by demographic, financial, or inequality factors 
typically considered to be predictors of program size? What mechanism or underlying 
change in the structure of the OECD countries can explain the positive time trend? 
Clearly, theories can be formulated that account for the empirical patterns 
found in our research.  To explain the coefficient patterns of the demographic variables, 
one might investigate a model in which generations feel responsible for the care of only 
their immediate parents.  A challenge for public choice theory is to develop a model that 
is consistent with our empirical findings, that has additional empirical hypotheses to 
which it can be subjected, and that has strong predictions which can aid in policymaking. 
Even in the absence of such a model, however, our work has pointed to several 
predictions in a reduced-form context.  Shrinking populations, if they mean a reduction in 
the size of the  young cohort relative to the elderly, should increase the size of the social 
security program.  Events that heighten the efficiency of the public pension program 
relative to a private savings alternative, whether an increase in the economy's long-run 
growth rate, a decrease in the interest rate, or an increase in the rate of inflation, should 
also boost the size of the program.  Finally, we find a disturbing secular tendency for 
public pension programs to rise rapidly both as a share of GNP and in terms of the 
average benefit paid. 
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1. Demographic variables, such as population size, are taken from various issues of the 
United Nations Demographic Yearbook. This is also the primary source for the 
household size variable, although where possible, it is supplemented with data from 
demographic yearbooks of the individual OECD countries. 
2.  The growth rate, GNP, inflation rate, and interest rate are computed from the 
International Monetary Fund Financial Statistics series on CD-ROM.  The interest rate is 
the five-year average of the longest rate available on the disc.  Price data are 
supplemented by purchasing-power-parity  figures taken from the OECD publication 
Purchasing Power Parity in the OECD, 1986. When this clearly makes no difference in 
our results, we use simple exchange-rate data from the CD-ROM. 
3.  Contributions and benefits for social security programs come from a variety of 
sources. The primary source is the OECD publication National Accounts, Detailed 
Tables.  However, these data were augmented where necessary with information from 
various publications, including statistical yearbooks for individual countries.  In addition, 
we use data on the size of public pension programs reported in the OECD study 
Reforming Public Pensions, 1988, which was made available to us by the OECD. 
4.  Descriptions of the individual public pension programs are largely taken from various 
issues of Social Security Programs around the World, published by the U.S. Social 
Security Administration. 
5.  Sawyer (1976) is a primary source for the Gini coefficients.  In addition, we use tax 
data from two OECD publications: "Income Tax Schedules -- Distribution of Taxpayers 
and Revenues," in OECD Studies in Taxation, 1981; and "The Personal Income Tax 
Base: A Comparative Study," in OECD Studies in Taxation, 1990. We  also use data from 
the World Bank's annual Yearbook, and statistical yearbooks from individual countries 
when they are available and contain income distribution or tax data. 
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Signs of Comparative-Statics Influences in 
Public Choice Models of Social Security 
Independent Variable 
Dependent  Median  Mt  Growth  R  i  v(ch)  v(inc)  1  1  variable  1  voter  rate 
+  impact positive 
-  impact negative 
+/-  impact indeterminate 









Mt  present (older) workers per pensioner 
R  long-run interest rate 
1  long-run inflation rate 
v(ch)  variance of number of children 











0  +  +  -  +  0  0 
0  +  +  -  +  0  0 
+  +I-  +/-  -  0  0  0 
+  (+I  +/-  -  0  0  0 
+  0  0  0  0  + 
+  +/-  0  0  0  0  + 
0  +/-  0  0  0  -  0 
0  (+I  0  0  0  -  0 
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Social Security Programs in the OECD 
Social Security Measure  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Full Sample -- OECD Countries 
Benefits per GNP  0.0633  0.0708  0.1 10  0.1 19 
Contributions per GNP  0.0553  0.0634  0.0983  0.1 10 
Public pensions per GNP  0.0462  0.0588  0.0924  --- 
Fraction paid by employer  0.457  0.383  0.400  0.580 
Real benefit per capita  0.293  0.530  0.976  1.362 
Real contribution per capita  0.265  0.466  0.869  1.271 
Public pension per capita  0.228  0.433  0.810  --- 
Real benefit per pensioner  1.962  3.186  5.713  7.157 
Public pension per pensioner  1.546  2.583  4.653  --- 
United States 
Benefits per GNP 
Contributions per GNP 
Public pensions per GNP 
Fraction paid by employer 
Real benefit per capita 
Real contribution per capita 
Public pension per capita 
Real benefit per pensioner 
Public pension per pensioner 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Benefits per GNP 
Contributions per GNP 
Public pensions per GNP 
(53 observations) 
Log real benefit 
per pensionera 
Log real public pension 
per pensioner (53  observation^)^  0.820  0.862 
Ratio of 40- to 60-year-olds 
to elderly 
Median age 
Long-run real interest rate 
Long-run real growth rate 
Inflation rate 
Log real GNP per capitaa 
Portion households 1-4 
(59 observations) 
Gini coefficient (54 observations)  0.378  0.0760 
a.  In thousands of  1982 U.S. dollars. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Benefits as a Fraction of GNP 
Constant 
Interest rate  0.202  -0.133  -0.193 
(1.254)  (1.009)  (1.447) 
Real growth rate  0.103  0.267  0.238 
(0.910)  (2.823)  (2.388) 
Inflation rate  0.43 1  0.303  0.174 
(2.456)  (2.382)  (1.254) 
Log GNP per capita  -0.033  0.0032 1  0.000405 
(1.269)  (0.772)  (0.107) 
Median voter age  0.00389  0.00589  0.00396 
(2.235)  (4.072)  (2.761) 
M, (Ratio of 40- to 60-  *  *  -0.0357 
year-olds to elderly)  *  *  (2.953) 
Time trend  0.0025  1  0.00 195  0.00171 
(3.372)  (6.957)  (5.929) 
Gini coefficient  *  *  * 
for flat-benefit rate  *  *  * 
Gini coefficient 
Portion households 1-4  *  *  *  *  *  * 
Number of observations  76  76  76 
Error scheme  Fixed  Random  Random 







Note: T-statistics are in parentheses under the estimated parameter 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Dependent Variable: 
Benefits per Pensioner 
Constant 
Interest rate 
Real growth rate  2.8  4.45  4.52 
(1.487)  (2.895)  (2.991) 
Inflation rate 
Log GNP per capita  0.462  1.08  1.05 
(1.612)  (1  9.796)  (2 1.092) 
Median voter age  0.012  0.0262  0.015 
(0.469)  (1.340)  (0.806) 
M, (Ratio of 40- to 60- 
year-olds to elderly) 
Time trend 
Gini coefficient 
for flat-benefit rate 
Portion households 1-4  *  * 
*  * 
Number of observations  76  76  76 
Error scheme  Fixed  Random  Random 




Note: T-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated parameter. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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